

COURSE SUMMARY

TTM4135 – Exam Review Lecture

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Motivation

- ▶ We summarize core concepts, security properties, and common failures
- ▶ Focus is on assumptions and correct use of cryptographic primitives
- ▶ Emphasis is placed on reasoning and system-level security

Security Goals

- ▶ Confidentiality: preventing unauthorized disclosure
- ▶ Integrity: preventing unauthorized modification
- ▶ Authenticity: verifying identities and data origin
- ▶ Non-repudiation: preventing denial of performed actions
- ▶ Availability: ensuring systems remain usable

Threat Models

- ▶ Passive attackers: eavesdropping only
- ▶ Active attackers: modifying, injecting, or replaying messages
- ▶ Security guarantees are always relative to a defined threat model

Historic Cryptography

- ▶ Early ciphers relied on simple transformations with limited key spaces
- ▶ Examples include Caesar, substitution, Hill, and Vigenère ciphers
- ▶ These schemes are vulnerable to statistical and known-plaintext attacks
- ▶ Their value today is pedagogical rather than practical

Symmetric Cryptography

- ▶ Uses a shared secret key between communicating parties
- ▶ Very efficient for encrypting large amounts of data
- ▶ Key distribution, not computation, is the main challenge

Stream Ciphers

- ▶ Generate a pseudorandom keystream that is XORed with the plaintext
- ▶ The keystream must be unpredictable and never reused
- ▶ Reusing a keystream leaks information about plaintexts
- ▶ The One-Time Pad is perfectly secure but impractical

Block Ciphers

- ▶ Deterministic encryption of fixed-size blocks under a given key
- ▶ Security achieved through confusion and diffusion
- ▶ Not secure on their own for encrypting multi-block messages
- ▶ AES is the modern standard; DES is not recommended today

Modes of Operation

- ▶ Define how block ciphers are used to encrypt long messages
- ▶ ECB leaks structure and must never be used
- ▶ Secure modes require randomness (IVs or nonces)
- ▶ Examples include CBC, CTR, and GCM

Hash Functions

- ▶ Map arbitrary-length input to a fixed-length output
- ▶ Security properties include collision, preimage, and second-preimage resistance
- ▶ Merkle–Damgård based hash functions are vulnerable to length-extension attacks

Message Authentication Codes (MACs)

- ▶ Provide integrity and authenticity of messages
- ▶ Require a shared secret key
- ▶ Attacks include existential and selective forgery
- ▶ HMAC prevents length-extension attacks
- ▶ MACs do not provide non-repudiation

Authenticated Encryption

- ▶ Combines confidentiality and integrity
- ▶ Encrypt-then-MAC is a secure generic composition
- ▶ AEAD schemes integrate both securely
- ▶ Examples include AES-GCM and ChaCha20-Poly1305

Chinese Remainder Theorem

The Chinese Remainder Theorem states that congruences modulo pairwise coprime integers have a unique combined solution modulo their product.

It is used in RSA implementations to speed up decryption and signing.

Finite Fields

- ▶ A finite field contains a finite number of elements
- ▶ \mathbb{Z}_p is a field if and only if p is prime
- ▶ \mathbb{Z}_p^* is the multiplicative group modulo p
- ▶ Elliptic curves are defined over finite fields, commonly \mathbb{F}_p and \mathbb{F}_{2^m}

Euler's Totient Function

- ▶ $\phi(n)$ counts integers that are invertible modulo n
- ▶ If $\gcd(a, n) = 1$, then $a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$
- ▶ Central to the correctness of RSA

Hard Computational Problems

- ▶ Integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems
- ▶ Cryptographic security depends on parameter sizes and the best known algorithms for attacking the schemes
- ▶ Miller–Rabin is a widely used probabilistic primality test

Key Exchange

- ▶ Allows shared secrets to be established without prior agreement
- ▶ Diffie–Hellman enables this but provides no authentication
- ▶ Authentication is required to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks

Authentication Protocols

- ▶ The goal is to verify identity, not secrecy
- ▶ Challenge–response protocols use freshness to prevent replay attacks
- ▶ Password-based authentication is error-prone if poorly designed

Digital Signatures

- ▶ Provide integrity, authenticity, and non-repudiation
- ▶ Typically implemented using a hash-then-sign construction
- ▶ Do not provide confidentiality on their own

Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)

- ▶ Certificates bind identities to public keys
- ▶ Certificate Authorities establish trust relationships
- ▶ TLS relies on PKI for server authentication

Replay Attacks and Freshness

- ▶ Replay attacks reuse previously valid messages
- ▶ Prevented using nonces, timestamps, or sequence numbers
- ▶ Essential for authentication and key exchange protocols

Forward Secrecy

- ▶ Limits damage from long-term key compromise
- ▶ Past session keys remain secure even if long-term keys are exposed
- ▶ Used in TLS and modern secure messaging systems

Post-Quantum Cryptography

- ▶ Shor's algorithm breaks RSA and discrete-log-based cryptosystems
- ▶ Lattice-based schemes are strong post-quantum candidates
- ▶ Several countries recommend hybrid deployments

Learning With Errors (LWE)

- ▶ LWE is a hardness assumption based on noisy linear equations
- ▶ The problem is given by

$$\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \pmod{q}$$

where \mathbf{s} is a secret vector and \mathbf{e} is a small error vector

- ▶ The error term prevents solving the system using standard linear algebra
- ▶ LWE is believed to be secure against both classical and quantum attacks
- ▶ ML-KEM and ML-DSA are NIST post-quantum standards based on lattice assumptions for key exchange and signatures, respectively

Transport Layer Security (TLS)

- ▶ Uses a handshake phase to establish shared keys
- ▶ The record layer encrypts and authenticates application data
- ▶ TLS 1.3 removes legacy algorithms and insecure configurations

Secure Messaging

- ▶ Requires asynchronous secure communication
- ▶ End-to-end encryption protects data from service providers
- ▶ Signal provides forward secrecy and post-compromise security

Encrypted Email

- ▶ Email uses asynchronous, store-and-forward communication
- ▶ TLS protects emails only between mail servers, not end-to-end
- ▶ End-to-end encrypted email uses public-key cryptography such as PGP
- ▶ Provides confidentiality and authenticity, but has usability and key management challenges